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2 Climate change and weather 
extrem es as risk multipli ers  
T i p p i n g  p o i n t s ,  c a s c a d i n g  e v e n t s ,  a n d  
s o c i e t a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  
Jü rg en Scheffran 
A b s t r a c t  
The role of global warming as a risk multiplier is discussed in an integrative 
framework connecting climate and societal stability, acting through complex and 
destabilizing impact chains beyond thresholds. These include complex social in-
teractions and self-enforcing collective dynamics such as breakdown of vulnerable 
infrastructures and networks; tradeoffs in the water-food-energy nexus; economic 
and financial crashes; social protest and turmoil; mass migration and violent con-
flict. Adressing the challenges through adaptive and anticipative governance can 
induce societal transformation processes to protect human security, develop social 
livelihood, strengthen societal resilience and solve problems along cooperative and 
sustainable pathways. In this context, key questions considered are conditions 
when climate stress exceeds the adaptive capacity of natural and social systems; 
tolerance ranges of stability and instability; impacts of climate stress on critical 
infrastructures and human-environment-interaction; thresholds of negative and 
positive tipping points triggering cascading events; and conditions for sustaina-
bility transition and societal transformation processes. 
KEYWORDS: Anthropocene, cascades, conflict, hot spot, migration, tipping points. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n :  T i p p i n g  p o i n t s  a n d  r i s k  c a s c a d e s  i n  
c o m p l e x  s y s t e m s  
During the 1980s, complexity emerged as a new paradigm in science and politics, 
increasingly shaping international relations. In 1989, the Cold War ended in a dom-
ino effect that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Eastern Bloc and a 
chaotic breakdown of the East-West conflict, which became a tipping point to an era 
of ever-growing complexity1 (Scheffran 2008). In the new world (dis)order cascading 
chains of events have emerged, including complex social interactions and self-rein-
forcing collective dynamics such as stock market crashes, social turmoil, mass mi-
gration, and violent conflicts that increasingly challenged international security and 
stability (Kominek and Scheffran 2012). A particular form of social instability is con-
flict, based in incompatible values, priorities, and actions of agents who undercut 
each other’s values and provoke responses, thus leading to the waste of resources and 
an escalating interaction if the conflict is not resolved. 
A crucial issue is whether growing complexity breeds instability, a question that 
has been extensively discussed for ecosystems (Scheffran 1983). While artificially 
constructed complex systems are dysfunctional if the components do not fit to-
gether, unstable modes tend to disappear in evolving complex systems while those 
with better fitness or control mechanisms survive. Systems are often robust and 
adaptive against the most likely disturbances in the core region of stability (Held and 
Schellnhuber 2004); however, close to critical thresholds between regions of stability 
and instability small and rapid variation can lead to a systemic break down. This is 
symbolized by the famous butterfly effect in chaos theory, which may occur when a 
system is already “on the edge”, driven by other processes. A key term is the sensitiv-
ity of couplings between variables, which determines how changes spread through 
the network of interconnections (Scheffran, Link, and Schilling 2012). Beyond a 
given sensitivity, threshold changes may trigger instabilities, tipping points, and 
cascading sequences. To maintain stability, it is essential to understand the condi-
tions under which small-scale micro-level events lead to qualitative changes at the 
macro level that propagate in space and time. New and unforeseen “disturbances” 
may endanger system stability and force it to adapt to changing conditions. 
A key term is “tipping point”, which is defined as the “point or threshold at which 
small quantitative changes in the system trigger a non-linear change process that is 
driven by system-internal feedback mechanisms and inevitably leads to a qualita-
tively different state of the system, which is often irreversible.” (Milkoreit et al. 
                                                                          
1 Complexity expresses the difficulty to describe, understand, or explain something. A critical issue is to find 
a description of a system that contains the essential features and components (Scheffran 2015a). Systems 
that initially appear complex can become simple once they are understood or controlled. 
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2018: 9). Tipping points often involve the three notions “that events and phenomena 
are contagious, that little causes can have big effects, and that changes can happen 
in a nonlinear way but dramatically at a moment when the system switches.” (Urry 
2002:8; Scheffran 2008:14). 
The continued expansion of human activities has become a driving force that 
transforms the earth system into a new geological epoch, the “Anthropocene”. Climate 
change, together with other environmental challenges such as land degradation, re-
source scarcity, and biodiversity loss, is interconnected with other problem areas such 
as globalization, poverty, and violent conflict through multiple linkages from local to 
global levels. Associated risks affect human living conditions and undermine the sta-
bility of natural and social systems, particularly in fragile and failing states (Starr 
2008). Thus, global climate change has been called a risk multiplier that amplifies other 
risks through complex impact chains that possibly exceed thresholds to instability. 
In this context, key questions are considered: What happens if climate impacts 
exceed the adaptive capacity of natural and social systems? Are there ranges of toler-
ance, in which systems remain stable, and beyond which destabilization to qualita-
tively different system states is likely? Will climate change trigger regional or global 
risk cascades? When will critical infrastructures that are essential for the economy 
and society become dysfunctional? Does the risk-multiplying effect of climate 
change connect various problem areas? How will human-environment interaction 
be influenced by climate stress? 
In the following, the role of climate change as a risk multiplier is discussed in an 
integrative framework that connects climate and societal stability. The main pro-
cesses include instabilities in the climate system; hot spots of climate change and 
human insecurity; vulnerable infrastructure and networks; economic and financial 
crises; social and political instability; environmental migration; and violent conflict.2 
I n s t a b i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  c l i m a t e  s y s t e m  
Weather and climate are considered primary examples of complex systems, and the 
Lorenz equations (a simplified mathematical model for atmospheric convection dy-
namics) became one of the roots of chaos theory (Sparrow 1982). The climate system 
is characterized by complex dynamic processes that are difficult to predict from 
knowledge of individual factors and equations. Although much is known about the 
effects of climate change on the components of the earth system, the interaction be-
tween the subsystems is still poorly understood. Since changes in one system can 
                                                                          
2 This chapter is based on several publications of the author that are adapted for this purpose (Scheffran 
2015b, 2016a, b, c, and Scheffran 2017a, b). 
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have direct or indirect effects on other systems, local events can propagate through 
complex causal chains and feedbacks on various spatial and temporal scales. 
One focus of climate change research is on weather extremes such as hurricanes, 
droughts, forest fires, floods, and heatwaves, often corresponding to processes of 
non-linear dynamics such as phase transitions, critical thresholds, and chaos, which 
are paradigms in complex systems theory (Bunde et al. 2002; Kurths et al. 2009). In 
terms of their intensity, extreme weather events are rare in a particular location and 
a given time of year within a probability density function estimated from observa-
tions (IPCC 2013: Glossary). They represent phenomena outside of a given range 
around the average, representing too much or too little of the respective variable 
(such as temperature, rainfall, wind intensity, etc.). They are associated with ex-
treme consequences that can burden the functionality and stability of the natural 
and social systems affected and exceed their resilience and viability range. The num-
ber and intensity of extreme weather events are likely to increase in the future (IPCC 
2012; Rahmstorf and Coumou 2011). 
In addition to single local events, the climate system itself can become unstable 
if critical tipping points are reached, for example by exceeding certain thresholds in 
global mean temperature that trigger amplifying effects (Lenton et al. 2008). These 
include the weakening of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation, the rapid 
melting of ice shelves in Greenland and west Antarctica, the release of greenhouse 
gases such as methane from frozen soils in Siberia or Canada, and the change in the 
Asian monsoon. These phenomena and related chains of events can lead to a global 
and lasting transformation of the earth system. Massive and abrupt climate change 
could also overwhelm the adaptive capacities of even the strongest states and socie-
ties. Less time-critical, although globally hazardous in the long term, is the rise in 
sea level putting many coastal regions and islands at risk, which in the end can ex-
ceed the local coping capacity and trigger instability. Given the large number of un-
certainties, it is a risky experiment to move into unknown areas of the climate sys-
tem, where amplification of impacts and tipping elements open up the possibility of 
global destabilization. A sequence of tipping elements could drive the world’s climate 
system into a qualitatively new state of a “hothouse earth”, posing one of the gravest 
dangers facing humanity (Steffen et al. 2018). 
In a world of interconnected crises, climate change can act as a potential risk 
multiplier through interactions between climate stress, environmental change, hu-
man responses, and social conflicts. We discuss how climate change affects human 
security and basic human needs (such as the availability of water, food, energy, 
health, and wealth) and societal instability events (such as forced displacement, ri-
ots, insurgencies, urban violence, and war) as well as the role of responses for trans-
formation, including stability, resilience, sustainable development, and peace. 
 Climate change and weather extremes as risk multipliers 23 
 
Figure 1 presents an integrative framework describing the complex interactions in 
the earth system (Scheffran et al. 2012a, 2012b). The couplings in this network can be 
characterized by sensitivities that represent the impact that a change in one variable 
has on another variable. In particular, climate sensitivity is “the degree to which a 
system is affected, either adversely or beneficially, by climate variability or climate 
change” (IPCC 2007: 881). Changes in the climate system affect the functioning of 
ecological systems and natural resources (e. g. soil, forests, and biodiversity). 
Depending on the vulnerability, this can have an impact on human security, e. g. by 
degrading the supply of water, energy, food, or economic goods. The sign of sensi-
tivities can provide valuable information to classify qualitative patterns or “syn-
dromes” (Eisenack et al. 2007a). Human reactions to environmental change can af-
fect the stability of societal structures, driving conflicts and social destabilization in 





















































Figure 1:  Impact chains and feedbacks in climate–society interaction. Source: 
adapted from Scheffran et al.  2012a. 
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complexity, avoid dangerous instabilities of climate change, and maintain stability 
despite system changes. To meet the goal that was agreed on in the 1992 UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to prevent dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system and the temperature limits of the 2015 
Paris agreement3, an anticipatory-adaptive policy framework is needed that avoids 
risky pathways and allows for a timely and qualitative system transformation that 
takes the form of a self-organized stabilization. Some types of complex interactions 
are discussed below, with climate change acting as a “risk multiplier” and possibly 
triggering social destabilization in complex crises. 
H o t  s p o t s  o f  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  a n d  h u m a n  i n s e c u r i t y  
In hot spots strongly affected by climate change, compound effects lead to multiple 
stressors on human security. Hydro-meteorological disasters (storms, floods, and 
droughts) are an immediate danger to the life and health of the most affected people 
(Germanwatch 2018) in both developing countries (e. g. the Indus flood in Pakistan 
in 2010, a drought in China in 2010–11, or the typhoon in the Philippines in 2013) and 
industrialized countries (e. g. the European heatwave of 2003; the Elbe floods in Ger-
many in 2002 and 2013; tropical storms in the US in recent years; wildfires in Russia 
in 2010; the European hot summer of 2018). For the most severe consequences, ade-
quate assistance is hardly possible and social systems become overloaded in the re-
gions of concern. For instance, in 2005 Hurricane Katrina caused enormous damage 
to the southern coast of the US and led to more than 1800 deaths; it displaced hun-
dreds of thousands of citizens and overwhelmed disaster management. The heat-
wave of 2003 in Europe left behind tens of thousands of casualties and damage to 
agriculture worth tens of billions of euros. The Indus flood in 2010, the worst in more 
than eighty years, flooded a fifth of the land area of Pakistan with consequences for 
twenty million people; it led to approximately 2000 deaths and destroyed 1.7 million 
homes and a large part of the infrastructure (Gemenne et al. 2011). 
On the other hand, climate change affects the long-term availability of natural 
resources, which can contribute to shortages and an unbalanced distribution of re-
sources. Examples include the degradation of fresh water, forests and farmlands, 
shortage of nutrition, the threat to biodiversity, and overfishing. Whether people are 
able to cope with the consequences and to limit the risks depends on their vulnera-
                                                                          
3 The Paris Agreement of the 21st UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP21) in 2015 aims to limit “the increase in 
the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”. 
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bility and adaptive capacity. These are influenced by their access to resources, infor-
mation and technologies, as well as by the stability and effectiveness of institutions 
(Adger et al. 2009). 
In hot spots, the stress from climate change can be associated with great human 
suffering and significant economic and social losses that undermine human secu-
rity. A large share of the risks is neither exclusively nor primarily related to climate 
change, but often also affected by pre-existing local problems instead. These include 
the degradation of ecosystems, poverty, political instability, overuse of land, and the 
absence of early warning systems and disaster protection. Most vulnerable to climate 
stress are regions whose economies are dependent on climate-sensitive resources 
and where infrastructures are particularly exposed to climate change, particularly 
developing countries with a high level of dependence on agriculture; coastal areas 
and river basins; as well as hot and dry regions. Human security is at stake if natural 
resources that are of fundamental importance for the existence of people and the 
satisfaction of their needs are depleted or degraded. 
While the primary consequences are often locally confined, it is possible that re-
mote regions are affected through teleconnections as well as by humanitarian aid, 
civil protection or other direct interventions (including military operations). Some 
reactions may further aggravate the given situation, e. g. when people in need en-
force the overexploitation of resources, move to other areas at risk, or use violence 
against competitors, in order to ensure their own survival. For instance, rising land 
prices may induce a search for cheaper land, a problem often found in developing 
countries, leading to environmental and supply risks and displacement of local us-
ers. Another example is the impact of land scarcity on the availability of water and 
on related crop losses. In case of droughts in major crop producing areas, global food 
markets can cause a fall in prices elsewhere. In this context, various trade-offs and 
exchange processes between different resources need to be taken into account. This 
is expressed in the nexus of water, energy, and food (see the following sections). 
V u l n e r a b i l i t y  of  i nfr a s t r u c t u r e ,  t e c h n i c a l  s y s t e m s ,  
a n d  s u p p l y  n e t w o r k s  
Critical economic and social infrastructure and supply networks are potentially vulner-
able to climate change. This includes systems for the supply of water, food and energy, 
goods and services, systems for the provision of communication, health, transporta-
tion and security, as well as human settlements and political institutions. When im-
portant subsystems fail, the disruption may spread through couplings and lead to the 
collapse of the entire system. The consequences differ for developing countries, which 
depend directly on ecosystem services and agriculture, and developed countries that 
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rely on interconnected technical systems but have more sophisticated protection and 
response mechanisms. The stronger the impacts are and the more subsystems are af-
fected, the harder it is for societies to absorb the consequences. Corresponding rela-
tionships have been studied in risk research for the failure of complex technical sys-
tems, in which the combination of different events can result in the loss of control (e. g. 
Bhopal, Challenger, and Chernobyl). Since not all contingencies are predictable in 
complex systems, often a minor event can initiate a chain of events that initially ap-
pears to be a “normal accident” that triggers catastrophes in tightly coupled human-
machine systems (Perrow 1984). In a globalized world, these tight couplings occur not 
only in technical systems but in other fields as well. 
Although geophysical events are not related to weather disasters, they can pro-
vide insights with regard to their impact on social stability. A spectacular example of 
a disaster risk cascade was the earthquake in Japan on 11 March 2011, which triggered 
a chain of events with global effects. The subsequent tsunami flooded parts of the 
Japanese coast extinguishing thousands of human lives, and triggered the nuclear 
accident at Fukushima that destroyed several reactors and spread radioactivity glob-
ally through the atmosphere and the ocean. Because of the consequences of this 
large-scale accident, the Japanese power grid, the nuclear industry, stock markets, 
oil prices, and the global economy were all affected. Automobile manufacturers and 
electronics companies worldwide cut back production because important compo-
nents were no longer being delivered from Japan. The shock waves from the nuclear 
disaster triggered a nuclear phase-out and renewable energy transition in Germany. 
This disaster impressively demonstrates how a single event can set in motion cas-
cading events that overwhelm human coping and planning capacities (Kominek and 
Scheffran 2012; Scheffran et al. 2015; Scheffran 2016b). 
In addition to earthquakes or technical accidents, weather extremes can also hit 
critical nodes in economic and social networks. For industrialized countries such as 
Germany, where both the economy and society depend on a functioning infrastruc-
ture, the stability of a sustainable supply system in response to extreme weather 
events is of great importance. Weather extremes such as the heatwave in 2003, the 
storm surge following storm Xaver in 2013, or the Elbe flood in 2013 lead to tempo-
rary impairments of transport or energy supply systems. From the perspective of cli-
mate research, it is important to assess whether extreme weather events can occur 
that exceed the adaptive capacities of supply networks. It is important to identify 
critical nodes and links in the global supply network and to understand how local 
failures of infrastructure components affect the global chain. Key research questions 
ask what happens in case of the failure of network elements, how shocks propagate 
in power grids, and whether a collapse of the network is possible. 
 Climate change and weather extremes as risk multipliers 27 
 
An example is the failure of power grids, on which the functioning of other sup-
ply networks and socio-economic systems depends. Hydro-meteorological disasters 
can temporarily affect the supply of electricity before power is restored. There have 
been cases, in which minor events triggered a major blackout. In the biggest black-
out in history in July 2012, more than 600 million people in northern and eastern In-
dia were affected due to an overload of the power grid. In November 1965, approxi-
mately thirty million people in the northeastern United States and in many parts of 
Canada remained without electricity for about six days. In California, there were 
regular power outages caused by insufficient generation capacity and market ma-
nipulation (Brand and Scheffran 2005). In November 2006, parts of Germany, 
France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, and Spain were temporarily disconnected from 
power supply. While there were various underlying causes in these instances, 
weather events were identified as trigger in other cases. In November 2005, after 
heavy snowfall in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony, one of the largest 
power outages in German history occurred, and some 250 000 people were without 
power for several days, resulting in a financial loss of approximately €100 million 
(Deutschländer and Wichura 2005). A snowstorm in North America at the turn of 
2013 and 2014 caused major power cuts for hundreds of thousands of people, leading 
to partial failure of the communication and transport systems4. 
If a particular resource supply system is hit, this often has effects on other re-
sources, in particular the nexus of water, energy, and food (Beisheim 2013; IEA 2012). 
Energy is needed for irrigation and for the production of food or water, and to main-
tain the energy supply, in particular for the extraction, transportation and pro-
cessing of fossil and nuclear energy. The development of unconventional gas and oil 
reserves (fracking, oil sands, and oil shales) has led to an increasing need for water 
and land. In addition, renewable energy sources such as hydropower and biofuels 
require large amounts of water as well. Regions with low rainfall are dependent on 
artificial irrigation for the cultivation of plants for food and energy. Even with large 
solar power plants, water supply in desert areas is a critical issue. Overall, the water 
demand for energy generation is estimated to rise twice as much as the demand for 
energy (Beisheim 2013). 
Climate change affects this nexus in many ways and increases the competition be-
tween water, energy, and food. For instance, nuclear power plants are vulnerable be-
cause they are dependent on the flow of cooling water. Warming of the water or long 
periods of drought or floods affect power generation, leading to critical situations 
when cooling water is no longer available or water in power plants is below the critical 
level (Beisheim 2013: 24). If water levels in rivers and lakes are diminishing during 
                                                                          
4 Ice storm blackouts frustrate tens of thousands; at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ice-storm-blackouts- 
frustrate-tens-of-thousands-1.2476866, last accessed 3 March 2020. 
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droughts, transportation of coal, oil, or biomass may become difficult or impossible, 
as was the case during the hot summer in Central Europe in 2018 (Olk and Witsch 
2018). Storm surges and inundation place a substantial pressure on the entire trans-
portation infrastructure. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina temporarily disabled more than 
a quarter of total offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico. This amounted to al-
most a fifth of total natural gas production and almost half of the available refining 
capacity, as well as important oil pipelines, thousands of oil rigs, and a large proportion 
of rail and sea transport (for an overview, see Kumins and Bamberger 2005). In 2013, 
Typhoon Haiyan destroyed part of the Philippines’ supply of renewable energy (Brad-
sher 2013). Since renewable energy sources (bio-, hydro-, wind, and solar energy) de-
pend on the given meteorological conditions, they are affected by climate change. 
The cultivation of bioenergy plants as part of a climate change mitigation strategy 
has intensified global resource competition as large amounts of water and land are 
needed that are then no longer available for food production (Scheffran 2010). With a 
shortage of resources due to climate change, market prices tend to increase, making 
the expansion of agricultural production more attractive. The rising demand for pro-
duction factors such as water, energy, pesticides, and fertilizers in turn increases en-
vironmental pollution and a growing demand for land (Beisheim 2013). On the other 
hand, rising food prices have adverse effects on poor populations (see below). To some 
extent, competition can be mitigated by synergistic effects, e. g. when hydropower 
plants achieve an optimal trade-off between water and energy use, solar energy is used 
for water desalination, organic waste is used in food production for energy purposes, 
and new jobs are created that contribute to development in rural areas. 
It is difficult to make supply networks more resilient to climate change impacts 
if disruptive events occur in rapid succession that have multiple effects, which hit a 
system simultaneously, either with short time delays or in a narrow geographical 
area. With the increasing intensity and frequency of climate-related events, the 
question arises as to when the capacity limits and resilience of infrastructure are 
reached and whether existing safeguards and adaptation measures are sufficient. 
E c o n o m i c  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  
Assets and economic processes such as global freight and trading, financial markets 
and prices that regulate the exchange between supply and demand are also exposed 
to climate change. Financial transactions and pricing information represent virtual 
transfer mechanisms, which link different events with each other – both globally and 
within a very short period of time. If these processes are disturbed by climatic 
change, production losses, bankruptcies of companies, or a sharp decline of the 
stock market may propagate across global networks and markets. 
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The economic crisis of 2008 demonstrated the instability of the complex inter-
connected global economy. Driven by reckless speculation and lending practices of 
financial institutions and shortsighted human behavior, local events and individual 
responses escalated, pushing the global financial system to the brink of collapse. Af-
ter a critical limit was exceeded, self-reinforcing mechanisms were triggered, lead-
ing to losses of hundreds of billions of Dollars and Euros worldwide. Public invest-
ment and regulatory policies were initially unable to compensate for the short-term 
fluctuations. The interaction between rating agencies and government responses led 
to a highly unstable situation. In Europe, the global economic crisis was followed by 
a crisis in Ireland, Iceland, and southern Europe, most dramatically in Greece. 
Although other factors were at work here, weather extremes and economic cri-
ses may also interact and lead to a downward spiral. According to the Stern review, 
abrupt and extensive changes in the climate system could wreak havoc in global trade 
and financial markets (Stern 2006). Risk cascades are possible due to multiple link-
ages between disasters and financial markets (Haas 2010; Onischka 2009). In addi-
tion to direct economic damages, global impacts are possible through reduced pro-
duction, supply shortages, and price increases for valuable goods, an overload of the 
insurance industry, flooding of major harbors, and the interruption of transporta-
tion networks and other components of the global supply chain. Through these con-
nections, extreme events in one country can induce production losses in another 
country, and these can spread through global supply chains (Levermann 2014). While 
the direct damages and costs of weather extremes have been frequently studied, the 
indirect economic consequences are still poorly understood. Some issues have been 
raised in the context of the indirect effects of bioenergy, particularly as in some parts 
of the world prices and yields of cereals have been affected by bioenergy production 
(Scheffran 2010), e. g. in the so-called “tortilla crisis” in Mexico in 2007. 
In the energy sector, various risks (natural disasters, infrastructure problems, 
strikes, riots, wars, political interventions) may lead to constraints on supply and 
market variation. High oil prices, as in 2008, are a driver for recession and social 
risks, or affect the willingness to accept a high level of environmental risk (Beisheim 
2013). Relevant questions can be raised if production losses are observed after ex-
treme events in a country that is a food supplier. Such events include the heatwave 
and related fires lasting several weeks in Russia in the summer of 2010, which re-
sulted in an export ban on wheat (FAZ 2010). The droughts in the USA in 2011 and 
2012 and in China in 2010–2011 were associated with price increases in food com-
modities as well. For poorer countries, the consequences of integration into the glob-
alized economy can be as instantaneous as the direct effect of domestic local events. 
Even in developed countries such as Germany, the impacts of extreme events on con-
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sumers are noticeable. Europe is not immune to the adverse impacts if negative de-
velopments in the Mediterranean lead to a spiral of escalation. An economically 
weakened southern Europe is more vulnerable to climate-related risks and would 
have a lower potential for adaptation. In general, problems of water and food supply 
could hit tourism and agriculture, lead to conflict and migration, affect neighboring 
countries, and spread across continents. Some examples are discussed below. 
F l o o d s  i n  A u s t r a l i a  2 0 1 0 – 2 0 1 1  
In the wake of tropical cyclone Tasha, Queensland and New South Wales were af-
fected by heavy rainfall in 2010 and 2011. The worst flooding in fifty years inundated 
an area equivalent to the size of Germany and France combined; it included seventy 
cities, thirty-five people lost their lives and 200 000 people were evacuated, includ-
ing from parts of the metropolitan area of Brisbane. According to media reports, the 
damage was of the order of AUS$1 billion and the loss to GDP stood at AUS$13 billion, 
which had a significant impact on the economic performance of Australia. Further-
more, about forty coalmines were temporarily closed or operated at reduced power 
due to flooding, so that the production capacity of the largest coal exporter in the 
world was severely impaired. Coal mining in Queensland fell by thirty per cent; coal 
production fell from 471 million tons in the previous year to 405 million tons. At 
times, the domestic coal industry was losing more than €70 million per day (Oldag 
and Walterlin 2011). Since the cost of raw materials amounts to more than eighty per 
cent of the production cost of steel, this triggered price hikes and supply bottlenecks 
in the steel industry. The chain of events was also felt in Germany and had an impact 
on car production, mechanical engineering, and other industries (Spiegel 2011). 
F l o o d  i n  T h a i l a n d  2 0 1 1  
Thailand was hit by an unusually long-lasting monsoon in October and November 2011, 
resulting in the worst floods in fifty years, which affected nearly twelve per cent of the 
country. The consequences were almost 400 deaths, property damage of more than €11 
billion, substantial loss of economic growth, temporary drops in tourist numbers, and 
massive crop losses. The neighboring countries of Cambodia and Laos were also af-
fected. In addition to the regional consequences, the disaster had an impact on the 
world economy. Supply failures in electronic components led to bottlenecks in the in-
ternational electronics and computer industry and an increase in prices of e. g. hard 
disk drives in Germany (Feddern and Schnurer 2011). German companies such as 
Volkswagen had problems with the delivery of important parts. Japan’s automobile 
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companies suffered repeated losses in production, shortly after the Fukushima disas-
ter. Although the Thai electrical and electronics industry was severely impacted by the 
flooding, the industry has recovered faster than expected (Gärtner 2011). 
D r o u g h t  i n  C h i n a  i n  2 0 1 0  a n d  2 0 1 1  
In November 2010, a once-in-a-century drought in China’s eastern wheat belt threat-
ened the winter wheat crop, which accounts for twenty-two per cent of the harvest of 
the world’s largest producer and consumer of wheat. An area of 1.6 million hectares 
and more than 300 million people were affected. The severe drought hit the domestic 
and agricultural water supply and led to the closure of parts of the Yangtze River for 
navigation, as well as to the drying-up of water resources and to reduced hydropower 
generation. In early 2011, more than 2.2 million people and 2.73 million units of live-
stock nationwide suffered from lack of water. Utilizing experience from past famines 
(1958–1961), the Chinese government has taken measures to reduce the risk of crop fail-
ure. They have invested in the water infrastructure and bought wheat on the interna-
tional market to compensate for the losses from the drought (Sternberg 2013). As a sig-
nificant proportion (between six and eighteen per cent) of annual global wheat produc-
tion is traded across borders (Lampietti et al. 2011), the decline in supply led to an in-
crease in wheat prices and serious economic impacts in the import-dependent coun-
tries of North Africa and the Middle East (Sternberg 2013; see the following section). 
S o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n  
Directly or indirectly through the integration of physical, economic, and geopolitical 
risks in a globally interconnected world, the impact of climate-related events can also 
undermine social and political stability in regional and global contexts. Due to glob-
alization, combined with rapid developments in computer technology, in communi-
cation, and in transportation systems, people are increasingly globally connected 
and able to respond collectively and rapidly to local changes. Accordingly, social and 
political changes in one region can have significant impacts in other regions, and 
determined groups can set in motion global chains of events that have an influence 
on international relations. This became apparent with the end of the cold war, the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Arab Spring in 2011, and the 2015 refugee 
crisis, each of which had a significant impact on Europe. 
Environmental destruction, poverty, and hunger affect social conditions in 
many parts of the world. Fragile and weak states with social fragmentation and poor 
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governance and management capacity are particularly sensitive, as the core func-
tions of government, such as law and public policy, the state’s monopoly on force, 
welfare, participation, and basic public services in infrastructure, health, and edu-
cation cannot be guaranteed (WBGU 2008). Climate change may contribute to de-
stabilization, especially if societies are in transition, for instance from authoritarian 
to democratic regimes. On the edge of instability, natural disasters can undermine 
the legitimacy and ability of states to protect their citizens from harm. If the agricul-
tural sector of a developing country is severely damaged, the livelihood and existence 
of many people is at stake. The loss of life, income, wealth, jobs, health, or family or 
friends provokes opposition and unrest that threaten the social contract and under-
mine the political order. Some of these processes occur slowly and contribute to the 
erosion of social and political stability; others happen quickly and overwhelm the 
problem-solving and adaptive capacity of communities. Various destabilizing pro-
cesses may intensify in climate hot spots and spread into neighboring regions. With 
the decay of the social and political order, non-state actors (private security compa-
nies, terrorist groups, warlords) penetrate the domains opened up by the power vac-
uum and trigger spirals of hate, terror, and violence. Countries with low average in-
come and a weak adaptive capacity are particularly at risk, while richer societies have 
more potential capacity for adaptation. Due to global interdependence, however, de-
stabilization in one part of the world may spread to other parts through complex 
chains. 
Various natural disasters have been associated with a temporary collapse of law 
and order. Looting and criminal acts have occurred after heavy storms, for instance 
after Hurricane Katrina in the USA in 2005 and after the 2013 typhoon in the Philip-
pines. After some storms and floods in southern Asia and Central America, the dis-
tribution of aid and relief goods was subject to disputes that were partly conducted 
violently (WBGU 2008; for a differentiated view see Brzoska 2018). In addition to 
storms and floods with usually temporary and local impacts on the food supply, 
droughts in major food exporting regions have a direct and lasting impact on global 
food markets because of their larger spatial and temporal scale. People who are 
highly dependent on agricultural production and the local availability of water re-
sources are particularly affected. In contrast, the indirect influence of climate-re-
lated events and disasters on water, food, and population have an international di-
mension. 
The most significant consequences include food shortages and a subsequent in-
crease in food prices, which undermine the living conditions of poor social groups. 
This includes recent global food supply crises such as those of 2007–2008 and 2011 
when food prices quickly multiplied and the number of hungry people increased by 
100 million to 1 billion (Beisheim 2013). For instance, in 2008 uprisings related to 
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food crises caused a change of government in Haiti, while in Cameroon twenty-four 
people were killed during protests and approximately 1500 were arrested (Sternberg 
2012). A particularly noteworthy example is the social and political upheavals in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2011 (on the food crisis see Smith 2014; 
Bazzi and Blattman 2014; van Weezel 2016). The series of protests and uprisings in 
the Arab world affected the entire region and provoked a regime change in several 
countries (Johnstone and Mazo 2011). Starting with the unrest in Tunisia in early 2011 
that forced the president to flee, the revolutionary impulse spread to Libya, Egypt, 
Syria, and other MENA countries, accelerated and multiplied by electronic media 
and social networks (Kominek and Scheffran 2012), which enabled the spread of the 
protest movement and motivated others to join. In the following years, the situation 
turned violent in some countries, especially in Libya and Syria. 
Which role rising food prices played here and to what extent climate change and 
extreme weather events might have affected these processes is still subject of scholarly 
debate. At the beginning of the revolts, some media reports suggested a link with the 
sharp rise in food prices at the turn of 2010 to 2011. A collection of papers published by 
the Center for American Progress examined the impact of climate change on the up-
heavals in the Arab world (Werrell and Femia 2013). The argument was not so much 
that climate change was a primary cause, but rather that in a political crisis the effects 
of climate change can act as an additional stressor that exceeds a “tipping point”. One 
of the factors that occurred before the crisis was the drought in China in 2010 and 2011 
(described above), which exerted pressure on the international market price of wheat 
and influenced the availability of food products. This coincided with other factors that 
further increased world food prices, including high oil prices, the development of bio-
energy, and speculation on the global food markets (Johnson 2011). 
The consequences affected much of the MENA region where the world’s nine 
largest importers of wheat in 2010 were located (based on per capita imports). Seven 
of these countries experienced political protests. In the MENA region, many house-
holds spend, on average, more than a third of their income on food (Sternberg 2013), 
while people in Western countries spend less than ten per cent. The dependence of 
Arab states on imported food makes them vulnerable to fluctuations in global com-
modity markets. Low incomes and high levels of resource imports and spending on 
food taken together affect food security. Reinforced by the sharp rise in bread prices, 
the existing public discontent with the government was magnified. In Egypt, the 
largest wheat importer in the world with a rapidly growing population, three per cent 
of the national income was spent on wheat subsidies (Sternberg 2013). As early as 
1977 there was the so-called “bread intifada” in Egypt, in which seventy-seven people 
died, and in 2008 there were bread riots. However, no protests took place in Israel 
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or the United Arab Emirates, which have a high per capita income, a smaller food 
share of income, and better adaptive capacities. 
The chain of events before, during, and after the Arab Spring illustrates how ex-
treme events can affect international relations in the interconnected world, medi-
ated through economic, social, and political processes. In this complex pattern of 
overlapping stressors (Werz and Hoffman 2013), climate change was not the main 
cause but a contributing factor to triggering a complex chain of events. The political 
upheavals affected the stability of the Mediterranean region and coincided with the 
economic crisis in southern Europe. For Europe, these events were quite significant 
because of the civil wars in Libya and Syria and increasing migration from North Af-
rica, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa (see the following sections). 
E n v i r o n m e n t a l  m i g r a t i o n  
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2018), 18.8 million 
people have been displaced in 2017 by natural disasters (which were mostly weather-
related), nearly half of the numbers of refugees counted in 2008. In contrast, 11.8 mil-
lion were displaced by violent conflict in 2017 compared to 4.6 million in 2008. Between 
2000 and 2016, floods were the most frequent weather-related disasters (followed by 
storms) and thus one of the biggest drivers of disaster displacement. For instance, as a 
result of the 2010 monsoon 15.2 million people in China and 11 million in Pakistan were 
displaced by floods. Every year millions of people escape from tropical cyclones, in par-
ticular in India, Bangladesh, China, the Philippines, Latin America, and the Carib-
bean. These countries often suffer from the consequences of severe cyclones. High-
income OECD countries such as the USA, Australia, and Japan are also located in 
storm-prone areas. Particularly devastating catastrophes with extreme destructive 
power include Hurricane Mitch in 1998, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Cyclone Nargis in 
2008, Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, Hurricane Irma in 2017, and 
Hurricane Michael 2018, leaving millions of people homeless. Heat- and drought-re-
lated weather extremes reduce the adaptive capacity of social systems and lead to wa-
ter, food, and health problems. Once traditional living conditions (agriculture and pas-
toralism) are suffering, long-term large-scale migration is one possible impact 
(Scheffran 2018). 
Such problems are likely to become more important as a result of climate 
change, although its influence is currently difficult to determine. Thus, estimates of 
future climate migrants vary substantially in the literature, from fifty million to a 
billion people. All reported numbers are disputed (Jakobeit and Methmann 2012; 
Foresight 2011). The IPCC Special Report of 2012 on extreme events and disasters 
states that climate extremes will have a larger impact on migration in the future 
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(IPCC 2012). And the Fifth Assessment Report finds evidence for increased mobility 
in seventeen cases of observed or projected mobility associated with weather-related 
extremes or impacts of longer-term climate change while decreased mobility was 
found in six cases and socially differentiated changes in mobility patterns in five 
(IPCC 2014: 769). 
Changes in the environment cannot only promote but also inhibit migration by 
increasing poverty in rural populations and thereby limiting their opportunities to es-
cape (trapped populations). Environmental impacts and vulnerabilities can increase if 
people migrate to ecologically fragile and conflict-affected regions, including coastal 
cities that are affected by storms and sea level rise. In Europe and the United States, 
climate migration is often regarded as a security issue and conflict factor, possibly 
leading to ethnic, religious, and political tensions between the local population and im-
migrants. One contributing factor is competition for scarce resources such as arable 
farmland or pasture, housing, water, jobs, and social services. Media coverage of 
events such as the drought in Somalia, boat people in the Mediterranean, and refugee 
movements along the Balkan route reinforce threat perceptions in Europe. With the 
establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coopera-
tion at the External Borders (FRONTEX), the “defense” of and against refugees – in-
cluding environmental and climate migrants – has been expanded and continues to 
grow. One response to the refugee crisis of 2015 was to increase border controls. 
So far, climate or environmental factors have not been identified as major contri-
butions to international South-North migration. The majority of people affected by 
precarious environmental conditions remain in their home region or migrate to 
nearby urban areas. For weak and marginalized people, it is more difficult to overcome 
long distances or other barriers (e. g. language and cultural barriers) than it is for the 
privileged. It is subject of debate to what extent migration can be proven to trigger po-
litical instability and conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007; Reuveny 2007). Response pat-
terns in security policy narrow the scope of action to the symptoms, with the risk of 
triggering a “chain reaction” between increasing migration pressure and counter-
measures (such as enhanced border protection, as observed during the “refugee crisis” 
of 2015–16). Adaptation strategies and international cooperation can help to overcome 
risks and even develop migration into an important measure of adaptation to climate 
change (Foresight 2011), strengthening the resistance and resilience of the affected 
communities. Migration networks can contribute to resilience and stable structures 
between source and destination countries, such as the transfer of remittances, 
knowledge, and technology (Adger et al. 2002; Scheffran, Marmer, and Sow 2012). 
Industrialized countries also experience environmental migration. The debate on 
this subject became more important when Hurricane Katrina forced hundreds of thou-
sands of people to flee New Orleans in 2005, among them numerous refugees who 
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never returned. Risk zones vulnerable to flooding in coastal or river areas can also be-
come uninhabitable in Europe and lead to migration, even if a larger number of do-
mestic environmental migrants is not expected in the foreseeable future. In contrast, 
the debate on the immigration of refugees from conflict areas can provoke internal so-
cial conflicts, an issue that become relevant in Europe since the summer of 2015. 
A large number of immigrants to Europe originate in the MENA region (espe-
cially from Syria and Iraq), Afghanistan, and the Sahel. These regions are directly 
affected by climate change, which potentially increases the migration pressure there 
(Bundeswehr 2012). Because of high population growth rates, climate change and 
resource depletion in large parts of Africa, the availability of drinking water and ar-
able farmland and pasture is expected to decline, potentially increasing dissatisfac-
tion and tensions among millions of people (Schilling et al. 2012, Busby et al. 2013). 
Water availability in some countries is already below the threshold for water scarcity 
of 1000 cubic meters per person per year. In Libya, per capita water supply amounted 
to only approximately 95.8 cubic meters in 2009 and to 356 cubic meters per person 
in Syria, significantly lower than the figures for 2002 and well below the world aver-
age (World Bank 2013). In the years before the rebellion, Syria experienced devastat-
ing droughts (Kelley et al. 2015) that hit the main agricultural areas of the country 
and displaced many people from the countryside to the cities (Werz and Hoffman 
2013; see the contribution by Christiane Fröhlich in this volume). Water and food 
supply in Egypt depends heavily on water from the Nile River, which is increasingly 
being utilized by upstream riparian states in recent years (Link et al. 2012). 
Frustration sparks protests, especially among the young male population, and 
increases their willingness to leave the country to travel to the North. The problems 
of North Africa are linked in complex ways to those of the Sahel, which is also af-
fected by climate change. Libya has been the destination of migration routes from 
the South because of oil revenues and related jobs. After the government was over-
thrown, tensions with immigrants increased. Some of the armed mercenaries in 
Libya went to Mali and other countries of the Sahel where they contributed to re-
gional political destabilization. In sub-Saharan Africa, climate change, desertifica-
tion and scarcity of resources have become connected with economic and social mar-
ginalization, political instability and violent conflict, which undermined the liveli-
hoods of farmers and herders and increased the migration pressure (Ionesco et al. 
2017). 
C l i m a t e  c h a n g e  a n d  v i o l e n t  c o nf l i c t  
By altering natural and social livelihoods in many regions, climate change represents 
a potential driver for conflict and related acts of violence. These include civil wars 
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and military interventions that in turn are associated with negative consequences 
such as famine, economic crises, refugees, resource exploitation, and environmen-
tal degradation (WBGU 2008). 
There is a widely held assumption that the progressing consequences of global 
warming will increase the likelihood of conflicts that are associated with the destruc-
tion of human livelihoods and resources. In addition, there are potential disputes 
regarding the adequate strategies for avoiding climate change as well as their financ-
ing. Examples include the controversy about the use of nuclear power as a contribu-
tion to CO2 abatement or the debate about the consequences of bioenergy, which 
also determine the German discourse (Webersik 2010; Scheffran and Cannaday 
2013). The same applies to differences on adaptation to climate change and its secu-
rity implications, such as alternative farming practices, protection measures like the 
construction of dams, and military operations in disaster management. technical in-
terventions into the climate system (climate geoengineering) to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere or to influence the earth’s radiation budget are also conflict-prone. 
Such measures raise critical issues of technical and economic feasibility, as well as 
on risks and responsibilities at global, national, and local levels (Brzoska et al. 2012). 
In all these consequences and responses there are concerns about justice when it 
comes to the distribution of the costs, benefits, and risks of climate change, which 
are likely to complicate cooperative solutions. 
The potential contribution of environmental change and resource use to violent 
conflict has been the subject of scientific controversy for more than two decades. 
While some studies claim that natural disasters and resource scarcity put social sys-
tems under stress, threaten their stability, and make violent conflict more likely, oth-
ers see no clear causal relationship for past events that is detectable by statistical 
methods. Those researchers emphasize the ability of human societies to deal with 
resource issues through collaboration and innovation (see reviews in Brauch 2002, 
2009). So far, most environmental conflicts have been regional in scope and have 
presented no threat to international security (Carius et al. 2006). The connections 
vary substantially regionally and depend on the affected resource type. While scar-
city is more likely to be a conflict factor for renewable resources (water, food, biodi-
versity), abundance is more likely to lead to conflict for non-renewable resources 
(fossil fuels, uranium, diamonds, coltan). In both cases, violent conflicts consume 
resources, which can drive or restrain a spiral of violence (Scheffran et al. 2014). 
Debates that are more recent have addressed the links between climate change 
and violent conflict. This issue was raised in the fifth IPCC Assessment Report (IPCC 
2014; Gleditsch and Nordas 2014). Some studies looking at long historical periods 
have found significant correlations between climate variability and violent conflicts, 
particularly in the Little Ice Age in Europe between the fifteenth and the nineteenth 
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centuries. Research on more recent periods has produced mixed results, which de-
pend in a complex way on the regional context and on the conflict situation (see re-
views in Scheffran, Brzoska et al. 2012a, 2012b). Studies using selected data and 
studies on the relationship between climate change and violence over all historical 
periods, world regions, forms of violence, and causal mechanisms (Burke et al. 2009; 
Hsiang et al. 2013) have exacerbated the scientific controversy (Buhaug 2010; Buhaug 
et al. 2014). 
Regardless of the interpretation of historical data, the impact of future climate 
change goes beyond previous experiences, leaving space for scenarios, plausibility con-
siderations, and speculation. It is indeed possible that societies have been able to adapt 
to moderate climate change in history but they may be overwhelmed in the future by 
rapid and strong climate change that exceeds their adaptive capacities. There is a wide 
range of possible conflict constellations (WBGU 2008) associated with the effects of 
climate change on rainfall and water scarcity, land use and food security, migration 
and refugee movements, extreme weather events and natural disasters. These pro-
cesses can become conflict factors individually or in conjunction. In addition, the ef-
fects of climate change on infrastructure and social destabilization may trigger societal 
“tipping points”, leading to social unrest, riots, violence, crime, and armed conflict. 
The vulnerability of agrarian societies with a high level of population growth and 
a low level of development is particularly pronounced (Raleigh and Urdal 2007). Pas-
toralists, for whom migration is part of their traditional way of life, suffer from long 
periods of drought that threaten the supply of water and grass to their cattle herds. 
Deviation from their usual routes can create tensions among herders or farmers, es-
pecially in regions with severe water shortages, such as West Africa and the Horn of 
Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. 
Whether climate change acts as a “threat multiplier” and creates a “climate of 
violence” depends largely on how people and societies respond to change, and on 
whether their adaptive capacities and institutional structures are adequate for main-
taining stability. While rich industrialized countries are not spared by climate 
change, they may benefit from advanced economic and institutional conditions for 
problem solving and conflict management. Potential issues of conflict in Europe in-
clude tensions over territorial claims and natural resources in the Arctic and the 
Mediterranean. The melting of polar ice sheets affects the strategic interests of Eu-
rope, Russia, and North America. Efforts between Europe, the Middle East, and 
Northern Africa to build a power grid based on renewable energy open up the possi-
bility of converting the Mediterranean from a region dominated by oil interests to-
wards a region of cooperative security (Scheffran and Brauch 2014), provided that 
the utilization of energy is sustainable and promotes development, peace, and jus-
tice. 
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As an example, the importance of climate change for conflict in North and East 
Africa is discussed. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Syria and Libya experienced 
bloody unrest that led to a coup in Libya, and in the case of Syria to a civil war, in 
which the contribution of climate change is disputed (Kelley et al. 2015; Selby et al. 
2017; see chapter by Christiane Fröhlich). Similar to other MENA countries, both 
countries are facing water problems that compromise the supply of this elementary 
good (Schilling et al. 2012). 
For several decades, Sudan has experienced political instability and violent con-
flicts, reinforced by national power games, regional struggles, and global geopoli-
tics. Peripheral regions such as Darfur are characterized by marginalization and ex-
clusion, and this leads to disintegration and secession. The complex nexus of prob-
lems includes population pressure, unsustainable exploitation of land and forests, 
declining agricultural productivity, food insecurity, and the spread of diseases such 
as malaria. Associated problems are environmental changes and resource degrada-
tion, which cause water shortages and the deterioration of pasture in the northern 
Sahel following drought and desertification (DeJuan 2005). This exacerbates compe-
tition for resources between herders and sedentary farmers. The expansion of mech-
anized agriculture continues to deprive nomadic people of their traditional migra-
tion routes, to dispossess peasants, and possibly lead to serious tensions. 
The role of climate change as a conflict amplifier in Darfur is controversial. 
While some observers classify Darfur as a “tragic example of a social collapse as a 
result of an ecological collapse” (UNEP 2007: 12–13), others are concerned about the 
oversimplification of the Darfur conflict (Butler 2007). They criticize the government 
of Sudan for exploiting the climate argument to distract from its own responsibility 
(Verhoeven 2011). Overall, climate change is one of many conflict factors in Darfur 
that reinforce each other in a complex way (Scheffran et al. 2014). A recent expression 
of the climate-conflict nexus is the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad region. En-
vironmental and climate stress from rainfall variability, droughts, and declining wa-
ter and arable land in a shrinking Lake Chad aggravates multiple vulnerability con-
ditions and contributes to livelihood risks and tensions between farmers, pastoral-
ists, and fishermen who may become the target of recruitment by non-state armed 
groups such as Boko Haram. Resource conflicts contribute to destabilization and 
displacement, fueling the region’s fragility (Vivekananda and Born 2018). 
G o v e r n i n g  c o m p l e x  c r i s e s  a n d  c l i m a t e  r i s k s  
The “complexity turn” in international relations (Urry 2005) is characterized by 
multi-level crises constellations linked through global connectors such as globalized 
financial markets, infrastructure and supply chains, media and social networks, 
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communication and transportation systems, as well as resource flows and climate 
change (Figure 2). When everything is interconnected, changes in one part of the 
world can have significant impacts elsewhere and propagate through systemic net-
works like a domino effect or chain reaction (Scheffran 2017a). Growing complexity 
provokes opposing trends of over-simplification, populism, nationalism, religious 
fundamentalism, illiberalism, anti-globalization, and anti-science attitudes that fail 
to address the underlying mechanisms. Without adequate management or reduc-
tion of complexity, the world may continue on a slippery slope of destabilization. In-
stead, stability may be achieved by adapting the complexity of policies to the com-
plexity of the systemic processes that they regulate. The challenge is whether human-
ity can anticipate and avoid hazardous pathways by counteracting forces that slow 
down and change course within the planetary boundaries of the Anthropocene 
(Rockström et al. 2009). Throughout history, Homo Sapiens was able to overcome 
constraints on resources in crises and to expand into new spaces by applying prob-
lem-solving capabilities and developing technical and social innovations that 
stretched the limits of growth, allowing more wealth to be generated on a shrinking 
base of natural resources. The question is whether humanity will succeed again fac-
ing today’s complex world or whether disasters destroy any chances of success. 
Operating in a multi-risk environment requires taking a whole-system ap-
proach to analyzing and measuring compounding risks (Mishra and Vivekananda 
2015). Although risks from individual processes like climate change may be relevant, 
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Figure 2:  Compound events and global connectors in complex crises landscapes.  
Source: adapted from Scheffran 2017a. 
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their impacts may be hard to prove. It makes sense to identify criteria for stability, 
determine thresholds when transitions to instability occur and identify factors and 
mechanisms that facilitate the transition across thresholds. Regarding climate-con-
flict linkages, the question is how stable a certain level of conflict or cooperation is 
when an escalation between levels occurs and which role climate change can play in 
these transitions. This is not a single-stage process but a continued interaction be-
tween climate stressors and governance mechanisms driving the dynamics through 
a sequence of decisions and tipping points between conflict and cooperation. 
Whether climate stress fuels a cycle of violence or climate governance facilitates a 
cycle of cooperation and sustainable peace depends on the effectiveness of human 
and societal responses (Scheffran et al. 2014). 
Strategies for sustainable and adaptive governance range from climate mitiga-
tion, adaptation, and the building of social networks to new capabilities of disaster 
management, crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and environmental peacebuild-
ing to stabilize human interaction. Various measures can support the adaptive ca-
pacity of ecosystems and their human values, including the establishment of nature 
reserves, sustainable land use, preservation of endangered species, and the protec-
tion of terrestrial carbon stocks. Within limits, ecosystems can adapt to climate 
change. To be sustainable, consumption of natural resources should not exceed their 
carrying capacity, given by their limited regeneration and absorption abilities 
















Figure 3:  Pathways, tipping points, and cascades of  transitions between 
conflict and cooperation. Source: adapted from Scheffran 2016c  
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challenge in international relations and global governance but there is little experi-
ence with integrative approaches in science and politics to understand and manage 
such level of complexity. Stabilization may be achieved by concepts of adaptive and 
anticipative governance that addresses and diminishes the complexity of the sys-
temic processes. Integrative and interdisciplinary knowledge helps to avoid danger-
ous pathways, influence critical decision points and develop collective adaptive 
strategies and interventions towards a more sustainable, peaceful, and viable world 
(Scheffran 2016c). 
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